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Automatic Identification System, commonly known as AIS, is a maritime communication 
system that is used to keep track of positions and activities of ships.  It is widely implemented all 
around the world, and mandated on vessels over a certain size according to the International 
Maritime Organization.  It is a signal broadcast over radio frequencies that contains ship 
characteristics, position, speed, and other information.  AIS is also being implemented in aids to 
navigation, supplementing and in some cases replacing traditional aids such as lighthouses and 
buoys.  The protocol standard contains no security, leaving AIS vulnerable to spoofing, 
hijacking, and denial of service attacks.  This paper explores the possible consequences of AIS 
exploitation, as well as options to mitigate risk.  Digital signature authentication of AIS signals is 
examined with particular attention paid to the feasibility and challenges of wide scale 
implementation.  Ultimately the potential benefits of digital signature authentication are 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Introduction 
Automatic Identification System, commonly known as AIS, is a maritime communication 
system that is used to keep track of positions and activities of ships.  Worldwide adoption of the 
technology is increasing every year, and it is being used to supplement or replace aids to 
navigation to reduce costs and increase service availability.  It is used to great effect to enhance 
situational awareness and safety in high traffic areas and large ports in areas such as Singapore, 
Hong Kong, Los Angeles, and many others.  AIS allows for a notable decrease in bridge to 
bridge telecommunications, keeping radio frequencies open for emergency use.   
Research has shown that there are several types of attacks that AIS is vulnerable to, and 
with no inherent security measures, the technology is very vulnerable to exploitation.  Anomaly 
detection strategies are heavily proposed and studied, but may not be appropriate for all cases.  
This paper is primarily concerned with authentication strategies that may be applied to AIS as 
well as adopting them to existing AIS infrastructure.   
Problem Statement 
 Across the world, AIS is used as a navigational aide by hundreds of thousands of ships 
and that number is only increasing.  The possible consequences of maritime accidents combined 
with the general ignorance of security risks and possible threats make this an issue of global 
significance, that can only grow more important as adoption increases and knowledge of the 






Nature and Significance of the Problem 
Starting in 2002, the International Maritime Organization mandated that “all ships of 300 
gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voyages and cargo ships of 500 gross 
tonnage and upwards not engaged on international voyages and passenger ships irrespective of 
size shall be fitted with an automatic identification system” (IMO Reg 19.2.4).  Adoption is 
growing even when not required, and agencies responsible for aids to navigation (ATON), such 
as buoys and lighthouses, are beginning to create virtual replacements for physical ATON to 
save on costs and increase usability.  This means that hundreds of thousands of vessels are using 
AIS, which provides a very large attack surface to any malicious actor. 
Objective of the Study 
 The objective of this study is to determine if there is an authentication method that could 
be applied to AIS with minimal adjustments to the protocol so that it could be implemented on 
existing systems.   
Study Questions 
 Is digital signature based authentication able to be successfully applied to AIS?  What 
must be altered to allow function with existing technology, or conversely, what characteristics or 
functionality of existing technology must be altered to allow authentication methods?  Is 
message authentication a viable solution to the problems faced by AIS?   
Limitations of the Study 
 This study is restricted to considering the problem of spoofing AIS signals, and how 




thoroughly investigated.    Additionally, this research is focused on a qualitative analysis of the 
issues involved, and does not rigorously investigate the variety of AIS transceivers.   
Definition of Terms 
AIS – Automatic Identification System 
ATON – Aids to Navigation 
TDMA –Time Division Multiple Access 
IMO – International Maritime Organization  
MMSI – Maritime Mobile Service Identity 
Summary 
 AIS is a powerful technology, that is used throughout the world.  There are no built in 
methods of authenticating a signal, so a malicious actor is able to generate and broadcast a signal 
that is almost impossible to identify.  With a thorough understanding of the risks and 
technologies involved, solutions might possible that can help mitigate the inherent risks of the 
system.  Digital authentication is one such method that may be able to alleviate the threat posed 











Chapter II: Background and Review of Literature 
Introduction 
 AIS is very familiar to mariners but hardly anyone else, so some thorough background on 
the workings of AIS is provided, covering the general use and also some key technical details.  
The primary body of work covering AIS vulnerabilities is explored to establish the existing 
vulnerabilities and consequences of exploitation.  An in depth scenario detailing a potential AIS 
spoofing attack is presented using a location in southern Green Bay, part of Lake Michigan in the 
United States to help elaborate exploitation possibilities.  There are many academic studies and 
papers regarding the use of anomaly detection and analysis to enhance AIS security, and fewer 
studies contemplating alternative methods.     
Background Related to the Problem 
An AIS transceiver is specially constructed to use radio signals over Very High 
Frequency (VFH) wavelengths.  This unit transmits and receives AIS data to and from other 
vessels, with 27 possible messages defined in ITU 1371-4 (ITU).  Standard transmissions include 
Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI), geographic position in the form of latitude and 
longitude, navigation status, among others.  While containing a GPS unit for clock corrections, it 
is most common for an external GPS receiver to be connected to the AIS unit to provide 
positional information.  AIS units are frequently connected to electronic charting displays, which 
affords the navigator the ability to view location data in real time.    
To illuminate the problems potentially caused by the inability to authenticate AIS, a 
hypothetical scenario involving the port of Green Bay in Lake Michigan was devised.  First, 




extreme winter temperatures and risk of ice formation, many buoys are removed during the 
months of October, November, and December and returned to the water once the ice has receded, 
usually in April or May.  The exact dates are published by the United States Coast Guard, in a 
publication called the Light List which provides the characteristics of aids to.  Depending on the 
position of the buoy, some may be replaced with a less visible, more streamlined version which 
is better designed to function in the ice.  If the regular buoys were to be left in the water during 
the winter, there is a high risk of damage and potential loss which would be very costly to 
replace.   
Recently, AIS beacons have been created for some of the buoys present in the Great 
Lakes to enhance their usefulness during the winter months.  The Green Bay Harbor Entrance 
Channel, a waterway quite familiar to the author, undergoes a significant change during the 
winter.  There are 24 buoys in the waterway; prior to the winter 13 are replaced with ice capable 
buoys, 10 are removed completely, and one buoy is maintained year round as ice capable, neither 
removed nor replaced navigation (USCG Light List 2017).  Three of the buoys that are removed, 
and two that are replaced also have an AIS beacon.  Figure 2.1 shows the channel with all buoys 






Figure 2.1: Green Bay Harbor Entrance Channel Summer Buoys (NOAA 2017) 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the remaining physical buoys, after the winter replacements are made.  
The arrow denotes an area of particular significance, elaborated below.  The outer approach to 
the harbor experiences a drastic reduction in available buoys, and the buoys that are present are 





Figure 2.2: Green Bay Harbor Entrance Channel Winter Buoys (NOAA 2017) 
The lay of the channel and the placement of the AIS beacons could potentially be 
exploited by a malicious actor.  The depth of the channel that cargo ships follow into the port of 
Green Bay is at least 25 feet (NOAA 2017).  Cargo ships on the Great Lakes have a tendency to 
fill to maximum capacity, so a ship planning to enter Green Bay will take on enough cargo that 
they require such a depth.  Figure # 2.3 highlights the position of two buoys that are removed, 





Figure 2.3: Green Bay Harbor Entrance Channel Buoys 9 + 10 Shoals (NOAA 2017) 
Also noted in Figure 2.3 are two areas directly outside the channel where the water depth 
drops significantly.  The highlighted area to the right side of the channel ranges in depth from 13 
to 18 feet.  If a malicious actor was to spoof the location of the two AIS beacons corresponding 
to the buoys in that location, it is possible that he could show their positions several hundred feet 
to either side of the channel.  This would potentially lead a ship to the shallow water area, and 
cause them to run aground.    
An experienced mariner would accurately judge this to be a highly unlikely scenario.  
Any cargo ship captain on the Great Lakes has years of training and experience, and there are 
many different aids to navigation not specifically mentioned designed to ease the transit of the 
Green Bay Harbor Entrance Channel.  Furthermore, the nature of the lake bottom in that area is 
primarily mud and sand; even if a vessel were to strike bottom there, it is unlikely to cause 
serious harm.   
The intention of this example is to show that, by spoofing only a few AIS signals, 
damage could be caused and traffic could be severely obstructed.  The port of Green Bay does 
not experience high volumes of vessel traffic; the higher the traffic, the more likely the chance 
that a vessel ends up falling prey to AIS spoofing.  An increase in traffic causes more 




additional tools.  In high traffic ports, it is much more likely to encounter vessels that do not 
frequently travel the area, and are thus unaccustomed to where AIS signals should be.   
It is valuable to briefly cover two common attack scenarios that are relevant to digital 
authentication: replay attacks and collision resistant attacks.  Collision resistant attacks involve a 
certificate authority, or some trusted third party that verifies the authenticity of a document or 
message.  Used extensively in website certificates, it allows a consumer to verify that the website 
is trusted by a legitimate authority, and thus safe to use.  When an attacker is involved in this 
scenario, the attacker can exploit the properties of hashing functions to pass off malicious 
information as legitimate.  Any hash function vulnerable to a collision attack can be exploited in 
this manner.  The attacker sends one innocuous message to the certificate authority, which 
reviews it and appends an authentication certificate.  The value of the certificate is copied onto a 
second, malicious message which generates the same hash value as the first message.  When the 
consumer checks the hash contained in the certificate against the message the values match, and 
the consumer is led to believe that the certificate authority authenticated the second, malicious 
message.  For greater detail on the steps involved, consider Stallings or Gebhardt et al. 
A replay attack is also well defined in Stallings.  In brief, it involves a malicious actor 
recording a message from a legitimate source in full.  At some later time, the malicious actor 
retransmits the message.  The message may be accepted as legitimate by the receiver, depending 
on the security controls present.  The easiest way to thwart replay attacks is to have strict time 
limits on messages; either a message is only valid for a defined period of time, or the message 




Contained within ITU M.1371-5 are the technical characteristics of AIS.  Particularly 
relevant information includes the maximum duration and slot size, 26.667 ms and 256 bits 
respectively (p. 16, ITU M.1371-5).  This translates into 2250 slots per minute for each channel.  
Despite the available space, messages contain a payload of less than 256 bits due to the 
necessary overhead involved in transmission.   
AIS uses several variants of Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) to allow the 
broadcasting units to avoid interference.  Given that a large amount of AIS units move around, a 
rigidly organized broadcast scheme would not work.  The primary scheme used for mobile units 
is Self-Organized (SOTDMA), which allows AIS transceivers to automatically adjust their 
transmission schedule around other units in the area as shown in Figure 2.4.  Messages contain a 
data field to assist in organizing, and transceivers work based on the shared GPS time unit to 
avoid slots in use (All About AIS, 2012).   
 




Other TDMA variants are defined in Appendix A, as well as the message types that use 
those allocations.  Stationary units do not need to organize around other transceivers, so are able 
to use set broadcast slots.  The ability to autonomously dynamically organize multiple 
broadcasting units is key to the success of AIS.  It keeps the transmissions relatively lightweight 
and successfully accommodates the mobile nature of ships.   
Literature Related to the Problem 
The default AIS protocol is vulnerable to several exploitation techniques that can be split 
into three categories defined by Balduzzi et al (2014); spoofing, hijacking, and denial of service.  
Even though the technology has been widely implemented since the early 2000’s, Balduzzi et al 
(2014) suspect they are “the first to conduct a security evaluation of AIS” (p. 10).  As possibly 
the first structured security analysis of AIS, they start from analyzing the AIS protocol and 
progress all the way to crafting and sending malicious AIS signals in a testing environment.  This 
paper should, and does for this experiment, form a seminal work for the investigation of AIS 
vulnerabilities.   
There is a body of work investigating AIS security issues, prompted in part by a 
recommendation from Balduzzi et al. that focuses on using anomaly detection techniques.  The 
basic principle is to establish a baseline of normal behavior that new data can be compared 
against, which any malicious data being flagged as anomalous and can then be treated 
differently.  Anomaly detection is a popular research area, and certainly has applications towards 
AIS security, but I argue it may not be the most appropriate solution for AIS spoofing.   
The criteria necessary for determining anomaly may not be present, or present to the 




al (2016) uses questions such as “‘Is the speed consistent with the type of vessel’ or ‘Are the 
declared GNSS coordinates compatible with the existence of a navigable area’” (p. 3).  The first 
question is useful for vessel traffic; it would easily detect the anomaly of a tugboat or barge 
travelling at 35 knots, but less useful for buoys.  A buoy is chained to a sinker which is anchored 
in a specific geographic location.  The amount of chain attached to the buoy has to accommodate 
for tides, winds, and other weather conditions, so there is some amount of slack for a buoy to 
move around the central point.  Despite only moving within a certain area, it is possible for a 
buoy to have some speed, and also rapidly and unpredictably shift direction.  There is certainly a 
limit to what speeds a buoy can expect to achieve, and Iphar et al’s method would force a 
malicious actor to be very careful about spoofing a message, but not eliminate the possibility 
altogether.     
Another method of anomaly detection proposed by Mazzarella et al (2017) focuses on 
vessels turning off AIS broadcasts when they engage in illegal activity.  There is a large amount 
of activity that varies in legality based on position, such as fishing, dumping, transferring 
persons, or simply transiting.  This method, while effective, only applies to vessels, and relies on 
a break in established AIS patterns.   
There are several papers investigating the use of AIS in maritime domain awareness, such 
as those by Iphar et al (2015) and Wreski and Lavoie (2017).  While not directly related to the 
topic of AIS security, these papers nonetheless enhance the importance of AIS security due to 
how integral AIS is to situational awareness of the maritime domain.  Without trust in AIS, a 
large portion of the available information is no longer reliable and drastically impacts the ability 




 AIS encryption exists in commercial forms today, provided by companies that 
manufacture maritime equipment such as Kongsberg and Saab (SAAB AB 2017).  This 
symmetric encryption is intended for use by Navy, Coast Guard, or police forces; it allows a 
group of vessels, all with the same type of AIS transponder, to send AIS messages that can only 
be decrypted by other members of the group in possession of the encryption key.  Depending on 
the transponder configuration, it is possible for the equipped vessel to send and receive 
unencrypted AIS messages as well, sometimes simultaneously.    
 
 
Figure 2.5: Alltek Marine Electronics Corp. AIS_Encryption (Alltek) 
An example of where this type of encryption could be used is during police drug 
stakeouts; each vessel in the police fleet would want to be aware of each other’s position for 
safety, but would not want the information to be public where it might be used by an adversary 
to avoid the stakeout.  In Figure 2.5, this would be represented by group B having encrypted AIS 
units.  When operating in encrypted mode, vessels in group A and C would not be able to see 




These types of encryption, commonly known as blue force AIS or blue force tracking, 
have little value for authentication of AIS signals.  It is limited to a select group of vessels, and 
relies on a specific configuration of equipment so it is not widely adaptable.  Fundamentally, it 
focuses on confidentiality of the signal, not authentication.   
 Summary 
 The scientific and maritime communities are well aware of the problems facing AIS.  
Efforts have been made to analyze, define, and tackle the vulnerabilities, but given the immense 
scope of AIS implementation there are areas yet uncovered by significant research. Anomaly 
detection grabs the lion’s share of the time, and certain commercial solutions do exist to enhance 
the security of AIS, but none directly address the issue of spoofing and the need for signal 















Chapter III: Methodology 
Introduction 
  This chapter contains an outline of what information is going to be investigated and how 
it will be integrated into the study, as well as an outline of what the software development hopes 
to achieve.    
Design of the Study 
 This research is intended to evaluate the feasibility and demonstrate a proof of concept 
example of implementing digital authentication to enhance the security of AIS signals.  It is 
primarily qualitative in nature; live signals were not studied.  Given the nature of the research 
questions at play, it is more reasonable to determine the feasibility prior to extensive work on 
developing a technical solution.   
 First, research was done into the technical foundations of AIS and the varying methods of 
digital authentication to examine the possibility of combining the two.  Once a thorough 
understanding of the technical challenges was achieved, several authentication methods were 
conceived of.  The feasibility and advantages of each method were analyzed.      
Data Collection 
 Real time data was not collected for this project, as it is focused on proof of concept 
evaluation and execution of digital authentication.  Research information was collected from a 
variety of sources, primarily government and technical standards.   
Tools and Techniques 
Essentially, the envisioned system is an additional software layer that would process 




message is authenticated, then the software layer returns a verified signal.  If the message is not 
authenticated, the software layer returns an unverified signal.  Future settings could be 
customized regarding what the display software does with verified and unverified signals.  If 
someone without this software layer encounters an AIS authentication message, it is dropped and 
ignored.  Python was used to develop this proof of concept software application.  Python was 
chosen primarily due to the robust supported libraries and ease of syntax.  Existing Python 
libraries related to cryptography such as pycrpto were used.   
Due to its nature as an interpreted language instead of compiled, the performance 
specifications of the program were not thoroughly evaluated.  More importance is placed on the 
demonstration of proof of workability; given that the results may not be feasible to apply in a 
large scale implementation, it is premature to be concerned with program optimization.       
Summary 
The research and work conducted in this study focused on acquiring the requisite 
knowledge about AIS and authentication to propose possible solutions.  Each solution was 











Chapter IV: Data Presentation and Analysis 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, all the gathered information covering the technical framework of AIS 
signals and how digital authentication might interact with it is presented.  New AIS message 
formats for authentication are proposed, and evaluated for security and feasibility.  The problem 
of key distribution is addressed.   
Data Presentation 
Vessels are uniquely identified by a Maritime Mobile Service Identity, also known as an 
MMSI.  The International Telecommunication Union created an identifier format in ITU-R 
M.585-7, as well as guidelines for use and distribution.  Each country is to follow the guidelines 
to establish their own registry of vessels so as to avoid duplication.  The nine digit MMSI should 
not be used in the generation of key pairs, as they are publicly known, but could prove useful in 
administering and listing public keys.  In the United States, there are two organizations that 
allocate MMSI numbers.  The Federal Communication Commission allocates MMSIs for private 
and commercial use, while the National Telecommunications Administration handles federal use.   
A message authentication code (MAC) is a method of authentication between two parties 
that share a secret key.  While MACs are an efficient method of authentication for end to end 
communications in some circumstances, there are several reasons that they are not appropriate 
for the problem of securing AIS communications.   
It would be impossible to rely on unique secret key pairs for each possible combination 
of AIS units.  Given the hundreds of thousands of vessels equipped with AIS, the number of 




some ships would still have an immense amount of possible pairs.  Furthermore, AIS is 
broadcast, not connection-based.  The added complexity and time needed to detect other ships, 
identify them, exchange keys and then initiate a communication based on the secret key would 
remove the benefit of AIS.  The SOTDMA transmission method is not equipped to handle large 
amounts of traffic in that manner; instead of five ships broadcasting in turn, taking up five 
message slots, each ship would send to each other ship and take up 10 message slots.  This would 
expand following the equation 
𝑛(𝑛−1)
2
 where n is equal to the total number of AIS entities within 
communication distance.  Any more than 68 AIS entities would overload the available channels.  
Considering the crowded nature of busy ports and the range at which some shore based 
installations can broadcast, this would be easily achievable.      
Just as multiple shared secret keys causes a problem, so too would the reuse of a secret 
key.  It would have to be included in some manner on the transceiver, as the operational 
environments of AIS preclude constant access to the internet.  In the event that a MAC is used, 
the secret key for a particular AIS capable ship or beacon would be available to anyone with a 
transceiver as they need the information to decode and authenticate the message.  With this 
knowledge, which is necessary for successfully authenticating received messages, a malicious 
actor could forge messages using the key which would appear genuine.  The secret key could be 
concealed in a variety of ways to make it difficult to access, but ultimately, unlimited physical 
access to the device and its contents will eventually reveal the secret key, at which point the 
authentication system is compromised.   
MD5 was chosen as the proof of concept hashing algorithm due to several considerations.  




transmission scheme, which helps reduce the possibility of dropped packets.  This also 
eliminates the need for receipt acknowledgement, which would be very challenging to 
implement given the broadcast connectionless nature of AIS.  It would certainly be possible to 
create a system that reconstructs an authentication message sent over several packets, but there 
would be no way to request retransmission of corrupted or missing packets.   
Prior to choosing MD5 for the single slot hash, a time trial was run in Python on the 
various hashing algorithms found in the pycrypto library.  Given the AIS slot duration of 26.667 
ms, an algorithm that takes significant time to execute would possibly interfere with the 
SOTDMA schedule.  MD5 and the SHA family were selected, and tested by executing the 
function on a single slot AIS message.  10,000 trials were conducted using the script in Appendix 
B on Ubuntu 16.04, and the minimum time for each algorithm contained in Table 4.1.    
Table 4.1: Hash Algorithm Time Data 
Algorithm Minimum time interval to hash one AIS 








As is evident from the table, all the values are the same.  What this shows is that there is 
no significant difference in the performance of the algorithms, and all of them are short enough 
to pose no problem to the regular AIS slot size.  The reason the minimum value is chosen is due 




would include interference from other CPU processes, and not accurately represent the execution 
time of the function itself.   
Also contained in Appendix B is a basic format guide for how an authenticated AIS 
message could be generated.    
Despite being suggested by Balduzzi et al, the X.509 open source standard is not 
considered in this study as a means of digital authentication.  This is primarily due to the size of 
certificates created following that standard.  With the goal in mind of minimal adjustments to the 
existing process of AIS, the X.509 certificates would exceed the guidelines published by the ITU 
which state that “if the length of the data requires a transmission using FATDMA reserved slots 
exceeding five (5) slots [...]  or, for a mobile AIS station, if the total number of RATDMA 
transmissions of Messages 6, 8, 12, 14 and 25 in this frame exceeds 20 slots the AIS should not 
transmit the data” (p 60, ITU M.1371-5).  There may certainly be validity in using the X.509 PKI 
standard, but it does not fit the minimally invasive focus of this research.   
Data Analysis 
The vulnerability of MD5 as compared to the SHA family or other hashing algorithms 
may in part be mitigated by the structure of the messages sent for AIS.  Any attacker attempting 
to exploit hash collision or preimage attacks would run in to two major problems.  As a result of 
AIS functioning as a continuous broadcast of information with constant, minor changes, a large 
number of exploits would need to be gathered, to consistently deceive a user for long enough to 
achieve some malicious purpose.  One flawless hash collision would only deceive a user for as 
long as it takes for the next AIS message to be received.  Transmission rates vary based on the 




C).  Additionally, those exploits would have to be realistic enough to deceive a user, which 
requires specific values that an attacker cannot control.  To deceive a user operating in a channel 
or harbor, the geographic positions have to be consistent and possible, which covers a very small 
subset of the possible values for the latitude and longitude fields.   
AIS is particularly vulnerable to replay attacks, but not all that susceptible to collision 
resistant attacks focused on the birthday paradox.  There is no three-party transaction that an 
attacker could exploit, as the authenticator is also the creator of one of the messages.  While an 
attacker could find two AIS messages that produce the same hash value, they would not have 
access to the generating station’s private key to encrypt them.   
Replay attacks take advantage of the absence of precise time indicators found within 
default AIS messages.  With only six bits devoted to sending the UTC second of transmission, 
messages are not limited and could hypothetically be sent whenever the UTC second matches.   
An attacker could generate a message with a hash value that matches a previously sent 
legitimate message (known as a pre-image attack), and then append the previously sent 
encrypted hash value to the new message.  The decrypted hash matches the generated hash of the 
message, so the transmission appears legitimate.  Several issues exist that would prevent or 
inhibit an attacker from exploiting this, however.  If the legitimate broadcaster is continuing to 
send messages, then the SOTDMA controls would place time constraints on the attacker to 
protect the malicious messages from interference on the radio channels.  When combined with 
the speed at which messages are broadcast, this means the attacker would need a ludicrous 
number of messages to effectively deceive anyone.  While this is likely possible, given enough 




If an attacker is able to exploit cryptographic hashes by creating a message that matches a 
previously sent hash value in an attempt to deceive a legitimate user, the content of the 
information can easily be identified as anomalous, if not fraudulent.  Fields such as Course, 
Heading, Longitude, and Latitude may be radically different if bits are altered from the true 
nature of the contact.  Even if the encrypted hash value matches the message, the message itself 
will be nonsensical.  Despite the cryptographic assurances that the message is legitimate, it will 
be noticed as anomalous by any competent mariner, who will reject it for inaccuracy even 
without knowing that the security has been compromised. 
To demonstrate the potential effects changing one bit has on position, consider an 
arbitrary point in Lake Superior, Latitude 46.765106 and Longitude -92.026352, shown below in 
Figure 4.6.  This point is roughly 3.25 miles (5.2 kilometers) from the harbor entrance, and 
approximately 2.25 miles (3.6 km) from the closest point of land.    Converted to their binary 
equivalents, those coordinates are 1101011000010010110111000 and 







Figure 4.6: Position outside Duluth Harbor 
Obviously a change of a single bit has varying effects, based on how significant the bit is.  
Changing the least significant bit (LSB) would be very difficult to detect, while changing the 
most significant bit (MSB) would be immediately and glaringly obvious.  For instance, a change 
of the 9th LSB only results in a difference of approximately 100 feet.  While not a huge value, 
consider the close quarters in which some malicious spoofing might take place; 100 feet could 
still be detected.  As more significant bits change, the difference grows significantly more 
pronounced.  Changing only the 10th LSB shows a difference of approximately 210 feet, while 
the 11th will provide a difference of 425 feet.  Shown in Figure 4.7 below, changing the 16th LSB 
provides a distance difference of almost 2.6 miles (4.2 km).  The original position is highlighted 






Figure 4.7: Change of 16th LSB 
As such, any change to more than 50% of the bits of the 30 bit longitude field results in a 
significant difference of several hundred feet or more.  Latitude values would be affected in a 
similar manner.  This greatly restricts the ability of an attacker to generate an arbitrary message 
that matches a hash.   
There are two possible formats for AIS authentication messages considered here, with 
some variations.  The first is an independent authentication message, which creates a new 
standard in an unused message id.  There are several variations within this idea.  Both would 
require a new message type be created using one of the unused message ids, and both would 
require some method of storing an AIS message temporarily while waiting for the authentication 
message to arrive.   
Option one would be to occupy only a single slot, shown in Table 4.2, which would limit 




caused by this approach is that there is limited space to include a message reference to ensure 
that the authentication is compared to the correct original message.  The Time Stamp and 
Communication state field are used for error detection and correction, as well as coordinating 
slot allocation so that message are not simultaneously broadcast.   
Table 4.2: Proposed AIS Message Type 28 
Parameter Bits Description 
Message ID 6 Identifies message type (in this case, 28) 
User ID 30 MMSI number of transmitter 
Authentication data 128 Encrypted hash digest of message to be authenticated 
Time Stamp 6 UTC second of transmission time 
Communication State 19 Allows self-organizing of the TDMA system 
 
This does not leave much space for any kind of identifier.  One solution might be to 
implement a message buffer in the software layer on the receiving end.  A received message 
from a particular MMSI would be stored, and the next authentication message from that MMSI 
be compared against the stored regular message.  Receiving a new regular message replaces the 
buffered message.  Overall, this method would allow for the use of single message slots, but be 
prone to inaccuracy by being unable to accurately match up authentication messages with the 
messages to be authenticated.  The security concerns posed by shorter hashing algorithms also 
reduce the attractiveness of this solution.  This is the method most susceptible to replay attacks, 
due to the limited space available.  
Another option for creating a new independent authentication message would be to use 
multiple slots.  This delays the authentication process compared to a single slot message, as the 
message must be received in full and reconstructed.  On the positive side, this allows for a much 




message such as message types 12-14 is 1008 bits, which could easily accommodate hash 
functions with outputs of 512 bits or more such as SHA3-512 or WHIRLPOOL.  This greatly 
increases security over the proven vulnerabilities found in shorter length hash functions.  
Additionally, the extended payload size allows for highly accurate message correlation.  A three 
slot message, with a maximum size of 768 bits, could fit a 512 bit hash, 30 bit MMSI, 6 bit 
message ID, and still have 220 bits to accommodate time, positon, or other specific data that 
would identify the message to be authenticated.  Depending on the size of the message to be 
authenticated, it would be possible to repeat the message in its entirety, in addition to including 
an encrypted hash value, which leads to the second type of authentication message. 
Table 4.3: Proposed AIS Message Type 29 
Parameter Bits Description 
Message ID 6 Identifies message type (in this case, 29) 
User ID 30 MMSI number of transmitter 
Primary Message Variable Complete data from regular AIS message 1-27 
Authentication data Variable Encrypted hash digest of Primary Message field 
Time Stamp 6 UTC second of transmission time 
Communication State 19 Allows self-organizing of the TDMA system 
 
The second type of considered authentication message would be a multi-slot message 
consisting of the original message as well as the authentication content, shown in Table 4.3.  
Reconstructed into a single NMEA sentence, this would eliminate several problems.  There 
would be no receipt delay between receiving a standard message and the authentication message.  
There would be a small verification delay, but that would also be present for standalone 
authentication messages.  There would be no need to store standard messages while waiting for 




possibly limited by the combination with an existing message.  Adding a 512 bit hash would 
require at least two slots added to any current message length.   
Option two is the clear winner as far as cryptographic strength is concerned.  
Unfortunately, that is not all that must be considered.  Option two also requires the most 
alteration of existing systems to function.  A system not set up to recognize authentication would 
have the following problems.  If existing message types are used, the system would not be able 
to handle the abnormal sizes.  If new message types are created, such as using message type 28 
(currently unused) to represent an authenticated message of type 1, the non-authenticating 
system would not be able to interpret the undefined message.  Considering both possibilities of 
option one, any non-authenticating system would be able to discard what appear to the system to 
be anomalous messages and process the regular AIS traffic.  There is no enhanced security, but 
also no loss of existing functionality.   
There are many intricacies to be considered when addressing the problem of key 
distribution for any asymmetric authentication method in AIS.  The specific areas include initial 
private and public key distribution for existing units, new generation of private/public key pairs 
for future units, and updating known public keys and compromised private keys post initial 
distribution.    This paper is concerned primarily with the administrative environment of the 
United States, with which the author is most familiar.  General concepts should translate to most 
other countries, while the names of organizations and specific details will not.    
 Initial distribution of public keys is, for the most part, an already solved problem.  Some 
AIS units are able to connect to a web interface for software and firmware updates (Kongsberg 




added.  This would require that commercial companies invest the time and server resources to 
distribute public keys; if there is little to no interest from civilian companies, and it is deemed 
important enough, the US Coast Guard could create a public key server and administer it in 
addition to their regular maritime management duties.  As the Coast Guard is responsible for 
domestic maritime security in the United States, this is a natural extension of their function.   
For AIS units without the ability to directly access an update server, the existing 
framework of Notice to Mariners (NTM) can be used to distribute public key information.  
NTMs are publicly distributed updates which contain important maritime navigational 
information.  In addition to containing a link to an online repository of public keys, the NTMs 
could also list which keys have been updated for which regions.  From this resource, a consumer 
could copy the updated list of public keys to external storage and transfer to the AIS device.   
The Coast Guard has an existing distribution system for NTMs, so this would require 
little change to include distribution of public keys.  NTMs are further split into Local NTMs, 
distributed regionally according to the Coast Guard Districts shown in Figure 4.8.  This has the 
added advantage of allowing a vessel to select those updates that are most relevant to them: a 






Figure 4.8: Coast Guard Districts (USCG NAVCEN, 2018) 
Obviously with public keys being public information, there is no concern about 
encrypting their distribution.  Normal care must be taken to ensure that they are not altered or 
otherwise interfered with, but they are intended to be publicly available.  Not so with private 
keys, which pose a far more challenging problem for AIS. 
One portion of the private key distribution is also easily solved.  Coast Guard, Navy, and 
other government vessels already possess secure communications channels for the distribution of 
classified information.  Given that the keys will be distributed to private, commercial entities, 
they do not fall under the stricter requirements of securing classified information.  Therefore, the 
existing government and military channels will more than satisfactorily protect the distribution.   
However, this only works to distribute private keys to government vessels and federal 
ATON.  There is no similar existing distribution network that can be directly adapted for 




updates, which may possibly be used in the distribution of private keys. That would likely 
require heavy adaptation of the existing methods.  The requirement to keep private keys 
individually secure necessitates different methods than what is essentially a broadcast of 
universal software updates.  In addition, it would require that the manufacturers devote resources 
to the upkeep and distribution, as well as require a second communication channel from the 
generator of private keys to the manufacturer for distribution.   
With this in mind, an alternate system presents itself.  Given that the government 
possesses secure channels that can be used for key distribution, an initial trial could be made 
using only federally maintained MMSIs.  A standard could be created such that federal MMSIs 
broadcast some form of authenticated message.  An optional upgrade for commercial systems 
would allow the deciphering of the authenticated message.  The private key management is done 
by the government, and existing systems can be used for the distribution of public keys.  The 
benefit to the typical consumer would be seen primarily from the authentication of AIS ATON, 
which is more frequently encountered in high traffic waterways.   
Summary 
 Digital authentication using the signature method of asymmetrically encrypting a hash 
digest can be technically applied to the existing format of AIS in several ways.  There are some 
problems that it does solve, but it fails in other regards.  Key distribution to support digital 
signatures is more challenging.  Some existing infrastructure could be used, but much would 






Chapter V: Results, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, the study questions posed in Chapter One are answered.  Additionally, the 
conducted research is summarized and final thoughts presented along with possibilities for future 
research on this subject matter.     
Results 
1. Is digital signature based authentication able to be successfully applied to AIS?   
It is absolutely possible to implement authentication using existing hashing algorithms 
and asymmetric encryption to create digital signatures.  Depending on the method desired, most 
established hashing algorithms can be used.   
2. What must be altered to allow them to function with existing technology, or conversely, what 
characteristics or functionality of existing technology must be altered to allow authentication 
methods? 
To implement digital signature authentication, there would need to be nontrivial 
adjustments made to existing systems.  It is possible to use the existing radio channels and 
organization schemes to distribute authenticated messages without change, but the generation 
and receipt of the signals would require new equipment.    
3. Is message authentication a viable solution to the problems faced by AIS?   
Digital message authentication is a technically possible but realistically unfeasible 
solution to the issues found in AIS.  There would need to be agreement on a key distribution 
system, as well as a time frame for implementation.  Given the quantity of active AIS devices, it 





There is not currently enough of a threat to AIS to make the expenditure of resources 
worth it.  Additionally, there are problems with AIS that message authentication would not solve.  
It primarily addresses spoofing but would not cover self-spoofing, as in broadcasting one’s own 
position falsely for purposes such as evading customs or international borders.  Anomaly 
detection is a more realistic and flexible approach to detecting such incidents.   
 Absent a large scale exploitation of AIS, it would be a more effective use of resources to 
increase training and professionalism of mariners.  Reducing overreliance on AIS, and 
encouraging active correlation with alternate sources, eliminates most of the issues that digital 
authentication would solve.  Digital authentication should be considered for any new system 
designed to replace or supplement AIS. 
Future Work 
 There are distinct avenues of exploration if one wanted to delve further into the topic.  A 
practical experiment using an AIS receiver can easily be imagined.  Using the characteristics of 
the receiver, a dedicated software layer can be designed to directly interface and manage 
authentication of signals.  Control over both the transmitter and receiver is necessary, which 
unfortunately limits the use of existing signal dumps as none would have any authenticated data.    
 Another possible area would be a limited distribution scheme focusing on federal entities.  
With the existing distribution methods more ably supporting secure private key distribution, one 
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1 POSITION REPORT S,R,A SOTDMA 168 
2 POSITION REPORT S  SOTDMA 168 
3 POSITION REPORT R ITDMA 168 
4 BASE STATION REPORT F,R SOTDMA 168 
5 STATIC AND VOYAGE RELATED DATA R,I N/A 424 
6 BINARY ADDRESSED MESSAGE R,F,I N/A 1008 
7 BINARY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT R,F,I N/A 1008 
8 BINARY BROADCAST MESSAGE R,F,I N/A 1008 





10 UTC/DATE INQUIRY R,F,I N/A 72 
11 UTC/DATE RESPONSE R,I SOTDMA  168 
12 ADDRESSED SAFETY RELATED 
MESSAGE 
R,F,I N/A 1008 
13 SAFETY RELATED 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
R,F,I N/A 1008 
14 SAFETY RELATED BROADCAST 
MESSAGE 
R,F,I N/A 1008 
15 INTERROGATION R,F,I N/A 88-
160 
16 ASSIGNMENT MODE COMMAND R,F,I N/A 96-
144 
17 DGNSS BROADCAST BINARY MESSAGE R,F,I N/A 80-
816 





19 EXTENDED CLASS B EQUIPMENT 
POSITION REPORT 
I N/A 312 
20 DATA LINK MANAGEMENT MESSAGE R,F,I N/A 72-
160 
21 AIDS-TO-NAVIGATION REPORT R,F,I N/A 272-
360 
22 CHANNEL MANAGEMENT R,F,I N/A 168 
23 GROUP ASSIGNMENT COMMAND R,F,I N/A 160 
24 STATIC DATA REPORT R,I,C,F N/A 168 
25 SINGLE SLOT BINARY MESSAGE R,I,C,F N/A 168 




WITH COMMUNICATION STATE ITDMA 
27 POSITION REPORT FOR LONG RANGE 
APPLICATIONS 
M N/A 96 
28-63 RESERVED FOR FUTURE USE N/A N/A N/A 
 
Access Schemes 
F - FATDMA Fixed Access Time Division Multiple Access 
I - ITDMA Incremental Time Division Multiple Access 
S - SOTDMA Self Organized Time Division Multiple Access 
R - RATDMA Random Access Time Division Multiple Access 
M - MSSA Multi-channel Slot Selection Access 
 


















Appendix B. Hash and Encrypt Format Code, Key Generator, and Timing Test 
# Authentication Function 
# input an AIS message, output an authentication message 
# The function receives the input str, generates an md5 hash, encrypts it with the private key, and 
creates a new message that contains the encrypted hash as a payload 
 
import hashlib 
from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA 




# random AIS string taken from catb.org/gpsd/AIVDM.html, AIVDM/AIVDO protocol 
decoding 
 
# for proof of concept purposes, consider the MMSI 367527820, of the Vista Star operating out 
of Duluth, MN 
# encoded using AIVDM protocol, that MMSI is Er0<< 
# to ensure proper decryption of the string, the encrypted and hashed value will be concatenated 
with the MMSI which will be used to select the proper public key  
 





# splitting the string by commas  
# this creates an array of each comma delimited section of the original msg 
 
split_str = ais_str.split(",") 
 
# split_str[1] and [2] contain the default sequencing 
# [1] is the fragment count 
# [2] is the current message count 
# 3,2 would mean this is the second of three fragmented messages 
 
# apply the md5 algorithm to the original message 
hash_obj =  hashlib.md5(ais_str) 
 
# encrypt the hash digest using the private key  
# first need to import the stored private key 
get_key = open("priv_key_store.txt", "r") 
priv_key = RSA.importKey(get_key.read()) 
 
cipher = PKCS1_OAEP.new(priv_key) 





# get the current second and convert to binary 
now = datetime.datetime.now() 
utc_sec = base64.b64encode(str(now.second)) 
 
# create a string containing the MMSI of the broadcasting vessel, and the encrypted hash digest, 
and other data 
# the message type for this one is 28, an as yet unused message type 
# 28 -> 011100 -> L 
# communication state is left null for this example 
# the value should be determined by the parent AIS unit following standard protocols 
hash_str = 'LEr0<<' + ciphertext + utc_sec 
auth_str = split_str[0] + ',' + '1' + ',' + '1' + ',3,' + split_str[4] + ',' + hash_str + ',' 
 
# create checksum from string 
# NMEA checksum is the sequential XOR of the string  
i=1 
checksum = 0 
while i < len(auth_str): 
    checksum = checksum ^ ord(auth_str[i]) 
    i+=1 
 







from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA 
from Crypto import Random 
 
# create a random number generator object 
random_generator = Random.new().read 
# generate a key pair of 1024 random bits 
key = RSA.generate(1024, random_generator) 
 
# create two files, to store the public and private keys 
priv_key = open("priv_key_store.txt", "w") 
pub_key = open("pub_key_store.txt", "w") 
 











# timeit is a library that contains useful time functions 
import timeit 
 
# create a timeit Timer object 
# the first argument, 
hashlib.md5('!AIVDM,1,1,,B,177KQJ5000G?tO`K>RA1wUbN0TKH,0*5C, is the code to be 
timed 





# call the function like so 
# t.timeit(#) where # is the amount of times the code is executed 
# it returns one number, the elapsed time 
# so t.timeit(1000) runs the statement 1000 times and returns the total time it took to do so 
 
 
# the repeat function allows for repeated trials of the code 
# called like so t.repeat(#,##) 




# the first argument is the number of cycles 
# it returns a number of values equal to the number of cycles 
# so t.repeat(10,2) will run the code twice and return how long it took to do that, 10 times.  You 
will get 10 numbers 
# t.repeat(10,1) will run the code once, 10 times.   
# general advice is to look at the min() of the times instead of the average, as the average will be 














































Appendix C. Class A Shipborne Mobile Equipment Reporting Intervals 
 
Ship’s dynamic conditions Nominal reporting interval 
Ship at anchor or moored and not moving faster than 3 knots 3 min 
Ship at anchor or moored and moving faster than 3 knots 10 s 
Ship 0-14 knots 10 s 
Ship 0-14 knots and changing course 3 1/3 s 
Ship 14-23 knots 6 s 
Ship 14-23 knots and changing course 2 s 
Ship >23 knots 2 s 
Ship >23 knots and changing course 2 s 
Reconstructed from ITU M.1371-5 
 
